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“While you are following any set of rules and policies, follow them to the letter. It is the 
only way they can help you.” 
- Edwards & Magee, 1966 
 
The need for an investment policy, carefully thought out and personalized 
 to accommodate the investor's particular objectives, is widely acknowledged. Once a policy is 
decided, the investor is advised to stick to it steadfastly as exemplified by the quote by McGee 
and Edwards at the beginning of the handout. Many investors have attributed their failures to 
their inability to adhere to predetermined plans. 
In my talk today, I am going to analyze the problems of adhering to policy from a 
psychological viewpoint. Some research will be described which indicates that we do indeed 
deviate from the policies we wish to follow. There are two key elements behind such deviations. 
The first sterns from changes over time in the goals, aspiration levels, or criteria that underlie our 
policies. Often, these changes are triggered by the fact that we are earning money or losing 
money. The second facet of nonadherence involves certain deficiencies in our thought processes. 
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These deficiencies allow two villains—random error and systematic bias—to obliterate our 
policies, often without our awareness of the fact that this is happening. 
After reviewing research that demonstrates the ways in which we fail to adhere to policy, 
I'll close with a discussion of some techniques aimed at helping decision makers to follow their 
policies. 
Let's look first at changes over time in our goals or decision criteria. At an intuitive level, 
almost everyone agrees that it's hard to follow a predetermined policy when your financial 
condition is riding the crest of good fortune or plummeting with a bear market. 
For example, Gerald Loeb notes that a bull market causes us to: congratulate ourselves 
for being such astute investors and to think how foolish we were to have been so conservative or 
how much better off we would be if we had taken greater risks. He cautions the investor to “stick 
to your long-term investment plan, not modified by the fears or exuberance of the moment.” 
Surprisingly, there is very little research on the stability of a person’s risk-taking behavior 
in the face of emotional turmoil caused by gaining or losing money; but what research there is 
supports our intuitive perceptions to the effect that changes in our state of wealth do change our 
risk-taking policies. 
Some of the most interesting research on this problem was done by McGlothlin in 1956. 
He studied the effects of prior wins and losses upon subsequent betting at the race track. 
McGlothlin found that, when it came time for the last race of the day, bettors tended to underbet 
the favorite and overbet long-shot horses. McGlothlin attributed this overbetting of long shots to 
the bettors' desire to recoup their losses with a big winning payoff. Since the favorites were 
going off at larger odds than they should have, those who did bet on them in the last race actually 
had a slight positive expected value going for them. 
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Race tracks typically return about 83¢ for every dollar invested by the bettors. So, as the 
racing day proceeds, and the bettors as a group fall farther behind, it is interesting to note that the 
proportion of horses bet to win increases while the proportion of place and show bets decreases. 
Win bets offer lower probabilities of winning, but higher payoffs. So this result is also consistent 
with the idea that willingness to take risks increases after a financial loss. Finally, McGlothlin 
showed that the amount of money wagered on a race was positively correlated with the odds of 
the winning horse in the previous race. Thus, after a race won by a long shot (which means that 
most bettors lost), more money was wagered than if the favorite had won. Again, this indicates 
that losing bettors increase their risk-taking propensities in an attempt to recoup their losses. 
Sarah Lichtenstein and I have recently conducted a study in Las Vegas where we 
confirmed McGlothlin's findings of greater preferences for high risk, high payoff gambles by 
gamblers who were losing money. We also found that gamblers who were ahead of the game 
became more conservative, placing greater emphasis on getting bets with high probabilities of 
winning, and thus preserving their newly-acquired wealth. There seems to be other 
circumstances in which just the opposite occurs. That is, where good fortune induces people to 
take greater risks than they ordinarily would accept. 
It is not necessarily inappropriate to change one’s financial objectives or risk-taking 
propensity as a result of a change in financial position. If the change is a substantial one that is 
likely to be relatively permanent, the investor's goals should be revised. Less defensible, of 
course, is a change of policy after a small, or temporary, change in wealth. 
One other type of situationally-induced change should be mentioned here. There have 
been many recent studies in which the level of risk acceptable to a group has been compared to 
the risk acceptable to the individuals who comprise the group. In situations where society as a 
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whole values a conservative approach, groups make more conservative decisions than the 
average of their individual members. Where society values risk, the reverse holds true—that is, 
groups are riskier than individuals. Thus, we see that individuals change their policies towards 
risk-taking when they enter the group setting. 
Next I'd like to focus on some aspects of policy implementation that are more subtle in 
nature and less familiar to us in an intuitive sense. These have to do with the notion that the 
faithful execution of one's own decision policies involves a considerable degree of skilled 
thinking. 
It is commonly believed that we can infer an individual's policy by looking closely at his 
actual judgments and decisions. However, recent research indicates that this may not always be 
true. Instead, there is now evidence which indicates that a person's judgments and decisions may 
often reflect his true policies imperfectly, due to the action or random error and systematic 
biases. Faithful adherence to policy appears to require a degree of skilled thinking that often 
exceeds the capabilities of human intuition. 
Let's look first at random error. The quote by Goldberg on page two of your handout 
describes the problem of error and unreliability rather eloquently. He says: 
He [the judge] “has his days”: Boredom, fatigue, illness, situational and interpersonal 
distractions all plague him, with the result that his repeated judgments of the exact same 
stimulus configuration are not identical. He is subject to all those human frailties which 
lower the reliability of his judgments below unity. And, if the judge’s reliability is less 
than unity, there must be error in his judgements—error which can serve no other 
purpose than to attenuate his accuracy. If we could remove some of this human 
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unreliability by eliminating the random error in his judgments, we should thereby 
increase the validity of the resulting predictions. (Goldberg, 1970) 
The presence of random error in highly-skilled judgment was demonstrated by Garland, 
who studied the reliability of radiologists as they attempted to detect the presence of lung disease 
on X-ray films. Garland found that a radiologist changed his mind about 20% of the time when 
reading the same film on two occasions. 
Another example of inconsistency comes from a study of expert horse-race handicappers, 
which we are currently conducting at the Oregon Research Institute. We're not really interested 
in horse-race predictions, we're studying the stresses caused by information overload, and horse 
racing provides an appropriate context in which to do this. We expect that the results will 
generalize to any domain in which the skilled integration of large masses of quantitative 
information is performed by means of human judgment. For horse-race handicapping is an 
information game, much as investment analysis is an information game, and although there are 
many differences between these two domains of risk-taking, there are many similarities as well. 
Figure 1 shows a typical past-performance chart, which gives detailed information about each 
horse’s recent performances. It doesn't take too much imagination to see the similarities between 
these kinds of charts and the data sources used in some forms of financial analysis. 
Our judges in this study were eight individuals, carefully selected for their expertise as 
handicappers. Each judge was presented with a list of 88 variables culled from the past-
performance charts. He was asked to indicate which five variables out of the 88 he would wish to 
use when handicapping a race, if all he could have was five variables. He was then asked to 
indicate which 10, which 20, and which 40 he would use if 10, 20, or 40 were available to him. 
Table 2 illustrates the five variables chosen by one of the handicappers. The upper part of the 
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table lists the variables by name. The lower part provides the values of each variable for the eight 
horses in one of the 40 races the handicapper was to judge. Table 3 shows the list of 40 variables 
chosen by this same handicapper. 
Each handicapper judged each of 40 races under all four information conditions. First he 
would see five variables and then rank the top five horses in the order he thought they would 
finish. He then received his first 10 variables and researched the horses. He then ranked them 
again using 20, and finally 40, variables. 
We had all of the information stored in a computer so the computer could print out the 
appropriate variables for every race. Each handicapper had his own personalized set of five, 10, 
20, and 40 variables. 
Five of the 40 races were repeated at the end of the experiment. By examining the two 
rankings for the same race, we can assess the degree of random error in the prediction policies of 
our handicappers. 
Before examining inconsistency, though. let's look at how accuracy and confidence 
varied with amount of information as shown in Figure 4 of the handout. We see that accuracy 
was as good with five variables as it was with 10, 20, or 40. The flat curve is an average over 
eight subjects and is somewhat misleading. Three of the eight actually showed a decrease in 
accuracy with more information, two improved, and three stayed about the same. All of the 
handicappers became more confident in their judgments as information increased. 
In Table 1, we see a comparison of the amount of inconsistency in our handicappers’ 
judgments at low and high levels of information. Consistency was measured in three ways—by 
the number of times the first-place horse was changed when the race was judged the second time, 
by the number of changes in any of the five ranks, and by the sum of the differences in ranks 
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from one time to the next. Each of these measures told the same story—there was considerable 
inconsistency in the rankings, and this inconsistency increased as the amount of available 
information increased. 
These results should give some pause to those of us who believe we're better off by 
getting as many items of information as possible, prior to making a decision. 
Next, I'd like to describe some research using a technique called the “lens model,” which 
further indicates the disruption of decision policies by inconsistency. 
Before describing the model, let me describe the subject’s task which is called a 
“multiple-cue probability learning task.” This awful-sounding task was developed to embody 
certain fundamental aspects of important real-world judgment situations. First, there are several 
cues that the judge must learn to us, in order to predict some criterion value. These cues differ in 
importance, and they can differ in the form of their functional relationship to the criterion. 
A specific example, shown on page two of the handout, may help clarify things. There 
are three cues ! 𝐴𝑋$ 𝐵𝑋& 𝐶𝑋() with numerical values between one and 10. The criterion, Ye, is a 
number between one and 20. 
The subject is shown the cue values of A, B, C. He makes a judgment, and then is shown 
the correct answer. (See display in the handout). In the experiments I'm going to describe, this is 
repeated for 200 learning trials. The subject is supposed to learn how to predict the correct 
answer from knowledge of the three cues. 
The experimenter controls the learning environment by means of a “policy equation,” 
which indicates how the criterion is related to the cues. Shown in the handout are two 
equations—one linear, the other nonlinear—which were used in the studies to be described. In 
the nonlinear case, each cue is related to the criterion by an upside-down U-shaped function, as 
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indicated in the handout. Notice the term E in the linear and nonlinear equations. This represents 
the small amount of error which was added to the environment to simulate the natural 
uncertainty in the world. 
Now, keeping the linear task in mind, let's turn to the rather gruesome looking Figure 5 in 
the handout. Figure 5 shows what is called the Lens Model for reasons that, if not obvious, aren't 
worth mentioning. It describes the statistics used to evaluate a judge’s performance in a multiple-
cue learning tasks like those we've been talking about. One slight discrepancy is that in the 
Figure the cue dimensions A, B, and C are called X1, X2, X3, etc. 
The cue values, X1, X2, etc., change from trial to trial. On each trial, the subject makes a 
response Ys. Over a block of trials, this response can be correlated with the correct answer or 
criterion, Ye. The index of subject's achievement, denoted by the symbol ra, is simply the 
correlation between Ye and Ys. 
If the policy equation controlling the environment is linear, like Equation 1 at the lower 
left of Figure 5, we can use it to predict the environment. We can build a similar equation to 
predict the subject, as in Equation 2 in Figure 5. The correlation between the two predicted 
scores Ŷe and Ŷs, is called G, the matching index. G will be high if the subject is employing the 
correct policy equation—that is, appropriate weights and functions. The degree to which the 
equation of the subject can actually predict the subject’s own responses is indicated by the 
correlation between Ys and Ŷs, designated Rs. Rs is an index of the amount of error in the 
subject’s execution of his own policy equation. Ken Hammond, who is responsible for all this, 
calls Rs an index of the subject’s cognitive control. 
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These relationships are listed at the top of page 3. Also listed there, on line 5, is the lens 
model equation showing that subject achievement, ra, can be expressed as a product of G, Rs, and 
Re. 
Figure 6 shows the performance of subjects who were trying to learn the linear and 
nonlinear policies described on page two. The values of ra, Rs, and G are computed for each of 
10 blocks, with 20 trials in each block. We can see that learning of the linear task is fast, but 
learning is relatively poor in the nonlinear task. Before discussing this further, let me note that 
we can compute the matching index, G1, even in the nonlinear case, by using the appropriate 
nonlinear equations to predict the criterion and the subject’s responses. Looking at the right-hand 
side of Figure 6, we see that G was quite high by the end of the 200 learning trials. This means 
that subjects learned what the appropriate nonlinear function was. The reason their achievement, 
ra, was so low was because of a low degree of consistency (Rs, the thin solid line). We see that 
subjects learned the correct policy, but could not employ it as consistently as they should have. 
Figure 7 shows the results of another study using this same nonlinear task. Subjects in 
two of the three groups were told the correct policy equation after 20 trials. As the center graph 
shows, G quickly jumped almost to 1.00 and stayed high for these two groups. If you look at the 
right-hand graphs, you’ll see that Rs, the index of consistency or control, was also high, provided 
that subjects did not get correct-answer feedback. If they did receive correct-answer, or outcome, 
feedback, their control over the execution of their policies was disrupted and their performance 
suffered. There was a slight bit of error added into the task equation so that the criterion, Ye, was 
not perfectly predictable. The outcome feedback thus contained some random error, and this 
apparently induced the subjects to be inconsistent in applying their own policies. 
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These studies indicate how random error can disrupt judges’ policies. Let’s look briefly at 
another disruptive element—systematic bias. At Oregon Research Institute, we have spent 
several years studying the ways that a person’s limited memory, attention, and reasoning 
capabilities induce systematic biases that result in his decisions being inconsistent with his “true 
preferences or beliefs” (true policies). 
The failure of one’s decisions to appropriately reflect his personal values or policies can 
be considered one of the most fundamental aspects of nonoptimal decision making. One example 
of this comes from an experiment that Sarah Lichtenstein and I did in 1968. In this study, we 
asked individuals to indicate how much they would like to play various gambles. The attributes 
of the gambles, which had to be integrated into the overall judgment, were the gambles’ 
probabilities of winning and losing and the winning and losing payoffs. The experiment was 
straightforward. One group of subjects rated the attractiveness of playing each gamble on a 10-
point scale. A second group of subjects indicated the attractiveness of these same gambles by a 
bidding method in which they put a price tag on each to indicate its worth to them. That is, they 
stated an amount of money such that they would be indifferent between playing the gamble and 
receiving the stated amount. In addition, some of the subjects in these groups indicated their 
subjective beliefs about the relative importance of the four attributes of a gamble (i.e., 
probability of winning, probability of losing, amount to win, and amount to lose). When subjects 
rated the attractiveness of a gamble, probability of winning was found to be the most important 
dimension. When they put a price on a gamble, attractiveness was determined primarily by the 
gamble’s payoffs. Yet subjects in both groups stated that they valued probability of winning as 
the most important attribute. Apparently, there was a failure to give proper consideration to this 
value when making the pricing responses. 
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Another experiment, conducted on the floor of the Four Queens Casino in Las Vegas, 
demonstrated a similar response-mode effect. Consider the following pair of gambles used in the 
Las Vegas experiment: 
Bet A 
11/12 chance to win 12 chips 
1/12 chance to win 24 chips 
Bet B 
2/12 chance to win 79 chips 
10/12 chance to lose 5 chips 
where the value of each chip has been previously fixed at, say, 25¢. 
Notice that Bet A has a much better chance of winning but Bet B offers a higher winning 
payoff. Subjects were shown many such pairs of bets. They were asked to indicate, in two ways, 
how much they would like to play each bet in a pair. First they made a simple choice, A or B. 
Later they were asked to assume they owned a ticket to play each bet, and they were to state the 
lowest price for which they would sell this ticket. 
Presumably these selling prices and choices are both governed by the same underlying 
quality, the subjective attractiveness of each gamble. Therefore, the subject should state a higher 
selling price for the gamble that he prefers in the choice situation. However, the results indicated 
that subjects often chose one gamble, yet stated a higher selling price for the other gamble. For 
the particular pair of gambles shown in the handout, Bets A and B were chosen about equally 
often. However, Bet B received a higher selling price about 88% of the time. Of the subjects who 
chose Bet A, 87% gave a higher selling price to Bet B, thus exhibiting an inconsistent preference 
pattern. 
What accounts for the inconsistent pattern of preferences among almost half the subjects? 
We have traced it to the fact that subjects use different weighting policies for setting prices than 
for making choices. Subjects choose Bet A because of its good odds, but they set a higher price 
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for B because of its large winning payoff. Because the responses are inconsistent, it is obvious 
that at least one kind of response does not accurately reflect what the decision maker believes to 
be the most important attribute in a gamble. 
We can measure a person’s utility for risk in terms of his preference for low probability-
high payoff bets. We obtained two measures of preference for long-shot bets for each of our 
subjects—one measure was based on the subject’s choices among bet pairs like the one in the 
handout. The other was based on his selling prices for these same bets. The correlation across 
subjects, between these two measures of the same characteristics, was only .46. A scatterplot of 
this relationship is shown in Figure 8 of the handout. Each dot in the figure is a person. Perfect 
consistency would cause these dots to fall on a straight line. Again, we see how this slight 
change in response—from choice to pricing—disrupts people’s risk-taking policies. 
Another kind of systematic bias was demonstrated in a recent experiment in which we 
predicted that dimensions common to each alternative in a choice situation would have greater 
influence upon decisions than would dimensions that were unique to a particular alternative. We 
asked subjects to compare pairs of students and predict which would get the higher college 
Grade Point Average. The subjects were given each student's scores on two cue dimensions 
(tests) on which to base their judgments. One dimension was common to both students and the 
other was unique. Some examples of the format we used are shown in Table 3 on page 10 of the 
handout. For example, Student A might be described in terms of his scores on Need for 
Achievement and Quantitative Ability, while Student B might be described by his scores on 
Need for Achievement and English Skill. In this example, since Need for Achievement is a 
dimension common to both students, we expected it to be weighted heavily. We figured that a 
comparison between two students along the same dimension should be easier, cognitively, than a 
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comparison between different dimensions, and this ease of use should lead to greater reliance on 
the common dimension. The data strongly confirmed this hypothesis. Dimensions were weighted 
more heavily when common than when they were unique attributes. Interrogation of the subjects 
after the experiment indicated that most did not wish to change their policies by giving more 
weight to common dimensions and they were unaware that they had done so. 
The message in these experiments is that the amalgamation of different types of 
information and different types of values into an overall judgment is a difficult cognitive process. 
In our attempts to ease the strain of processing information, we often resort to judgmental 
strategies that do an injustice to the underlying values and policies that we’re trying implement. 
Investment policies are often based on some expected level of performance—expected 
rate of return, expected risk, expected covariation, etc. If we feel that the returns on our 
investments are not running true to form we may be tempted to assume that we made a mistake 
in our calculations or that there has been a fundamental change in the conditions underlying 
those calculations. Either assumption could be considered grounds for rearranging our 
investments in an attempt to get them to conform to the properties we desire. 
The problem is that the probabilistic nature of investment parameters leads them to 
fluctuate randomly about their expected performance levels. It takes a statistician to determine 
whether observed deviations are due to factors other than random chance. If we attempt to make 
such judgments intuitively, we’re likely to fall victim to another systematic bias—the 
underestimation of sampling variability. Psychologists Tversky and Kahneman have found that 
even people with statistical training overestimate the validity of small samples of data when they 
are relying solely on their intuition. People are too quick to interpret a deviation from expected 
values as due to a change in the world, rather than mere sampling variability. Tversky and 
 14 
Kahneman concluded that the only effective precaution against overreacting to small samples of 
data is to employ formal statistical procedures, rather than intuition, to evaluate deviations from 
expected levels of performance. 
A major problem that a decision maker faces in his attempt to be faithful to his policy is 
the fact that his insight into his own behavior may be inaccurate. He may not be aware of the fact 
that he is employing a different policy than he thinks he’s using. This problem is illustrated by a 
study that Dan Fleissner, Scott Bauman, and I did, in which 13 stockbrokers and five graduate 
students served as subjects. Each subject evaluated the potential capital appreciation of 64 
securities. Figure 9 illustrates the way that information about each company was displayed. A 
mathematical model was then constructed to predict each subject's judgments. One output from 
the model was an index of the relative importance of each of the eight information items in 
determining each subject’s judgments. These importance weights are shown at the top of Table 
4. Below them in Table 4 are the subject’s perceptions of their weighting policies. Examination 
of Table 4 shows that the broker’s perceived weights did not relate closely to the weights derived 
from their actual judgments. For example, Broker 6 thought he gave most weight to Industry, but 
he actually gave that factor less weight than any other. The importance of Industry was 
consistently overestimated by the brokers; also, Volume was perceived as more important than 
resistance and support, a fact that was not evident in the policies calculated from the actual 
judgments. The students’ perceptions were more accurate than the brokers. This prompted an 
examination of the relationship between number of years’ experience as a broker and accuracy of 
self-insight. The correlation was -.43, indicating a tendency for the more experienced brokers to 
be less accurate in perceiving their own weighting policies. 
 15 
Well, if I've been successful in demonstrating the variety of problems involved in 
adhering to a decision policy, the natural question at this point is—what can be done to facilitate 
adherence to policy? 
There are at least three basic therapies we can try. The first is a tonic to reduce random 
error, called bootstrapping. It is applicable in situations where a judge or decision maker makes a 
large number of decisions on the basis of quantitative information. Bootstrapping involves 
building a model to represent the judge’s decision policy. This model may take the form of an 
algebraic equation or it may be a complex decision tree like Clarkson's model of a bank's trust 
investment officer. Once the model is available, it can be substituted for the decision maker. The 
advantage is that the model can be applied without error. Surprisingly, this actually works. There 
are a number of studies in which a judge's model is shown to outperform the judge himself in 
predicting some criterion. 
Of course, the bootstrapping procedure preserves any systematic biases in the judge’s 
behavior. Implicit in the use of bootstrapping is the assumption that these systematic biases will 
be less detrimental to performance than the inconsistency of unaided human judgment. 
The second technique for facilitating adherence to policy is based on the decomposition 
principle. Rather than trying to infer policy from the decision maker’s behavior, we can ask him 
directly about all the essential elements of his policy. We can ask him to indicate the relevant 
attributes and their weights and we can then combine these by means of some logically optimal 
model. The difference between this and bootstrapping is that in bootstrapping we attempt to infer 
the policy by observing a representative set of decisions. With decomposition, we ask the 
decision maker directly about his policy and then build a model to apply that policy with 
consistency. We are presently doing an experiment at Oregon Research Institute that attempts to 
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determine whether the decomposition approach can improve upon an expert’s intuitive 
judgments. 
The third approach to helping a decision maker abide by his policies comes out of the 
“lens model” research discussed earlier. Remember the task with the three cues A, B and C, each 
related to the criterion by an inverse U-shaped function, and each having a different importance 
weight? Recall that performance on this task is impaired by subjects’ inability to apply their 
policies with consistency. Hammond has shown that consistency in this task, and thus 
achievement, improves dramatically when subjects are given computerized feedback, as shown 
in Figure 10 of your handout. The subjects make a series of 10 judgments. The computer then 
displays the key elements of their policies (their weights and the functional relationships between 
the cues and their responses). It also shows them the optimal or desired policy so they can 
compare the components of their policies with the policy they should be employing. Figure 11 
compares the performance of a subject who received this computer feedback with the 
performance of subjects who received more traditional kinds of feedback. Performance is quite 
good for the computer graphics group and Figure 12 indicates why both G and Rs are high. This 
type of feedback helps individuals apply the correct policy with relatively little random error. 
Although my knowledge of investment policies is limited, it seems to me that this kind of 
computerized feedback could be employed just as readily to help an investor compare his actual 
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11 while you are following any set of rules and policies, follow 
them to the letter. It is the only way they can help you [Edwards & 
Magee, 1966] . " 
I. Introduction 
A. Statement of the problem 
B. Overview of this presentation 
1. key facets of nonadherence to policy 
a. changes in criteria, goals, or aspiration levels 
b. lack of necessary cognitive skills: random error and systematic 
bias 
2. te~hniques to facilitate adherence to policy 
II . Changes in Criteria, Goals, or Aspirations 
A. Wall Street folklore and research agree: sudden gains and losses can 
alter one ' s goals and, accordingly, one's propensity for taking risks. 
1. McGlothlin (1956) found that losing bettors at the race track 
developed increased preferences for low probability, high payoff 
bets in an attempt to recoup their losses. Research in Las Vegas 
shows that gamblers who win money sometimes become more conservative. 
2. Changes in policy are desirable if they are in response to 
relatively stable changes in financial position. 
B. Group decisions embody risk-taking criteria different than the 
criteria of the individuals in the group. 
III. Policy Implementation as Skilled Thinking 
A. Contrary to popular belief, an individual's overt judgments and decisions 
may reflect his "true decision policies" only imperfectly; observed 
judgments deviate from desired policy due to the presence of random 
error (inconsistency) and systematic bias es. Faithful adherence to 
policy requires a degree of cognitive skill that may often exceed our 
intuitive capabilities. 
B. Random error 
l. "He [ the judge J 'has his days' : Borde om, fatigue, illness, situational 
and interpersonal distractions all plague him, with the result that his 
repeated judgments of the exact same stimulus configuration are not iden-
tical. He is subject to all those human frailties which lower the 
reliability of his judgments below unity. And, if the judge's relia-
bility is less than unity, there must be error in his judgments--error 
which can serve no other purpose than to attenuate his accuracy. If 
we could remove some of this human unreliability by eliminating the 
random error in his judgments, we should thereby increase the 
validity of the resulting predictions [Goldberg, 1970]." 
2. Studies by Garland (1959) and others have revealed a surprising 
degree of inconsistency when a physician diagnoses the same case 
on two or more occasions. 
3. A study cf expert horse-race handicappers shows that as the amount 
of available information increases (a) accuracy remains stable, (b) 
confidence rises sharply, and (c) judgment policies exhibit more 
random error. 
See Figures 1, 2, 3, & 4, and Table l 
4. Research with the "lens model" illustrates the importance of 
"cognitive control." 
a. the learning task (multiple-cue probability learning) 
3 3 {'1' x2' "/3} with numerical levels between l and 10 cues A, B, & 
a criterion (Y) that ranges between land 20 
e 
policy weights: A= .4, B = .8, C = .2 
task equations (policies to be learned): 
linear y = .4A + . 8B + .2C + Error e 
2 
a3) 2 + a 2B + a 3) nonlinear y = .4(a1A + a 2A + + .8(a1B e 
.2(a1c 2 + a2C + 
Yel6 b l0_ 
( (!} I IQ r 10 
A B C 











basic stimulus display 
+ 
A, B, C change 
from trial to 
trial for 200 
trials. 
Petife Drake 110 Lt . ch. f, 1, by Admiral Drake-Prtite Soeur, by Beau Pere. 
Breeder. C. C. Jamieson. 1~60 3 M O O --
Owner, Mr.!. Mrs. C. C. J amieson. Trainer, L. W. Kidd. .-r.,ooo 1959 0 M 0 0 --
~l;,y 11-60•B.M 6 f 1:12¼ fl 56 11 3 1! 2h 2' S•J SchcihFJ MSOOO 76 VcgasBoy118 Gn1perlee118 Pioneer Joe 12 
Apr27 -GOIB .M 6 f 1:13',~sy 73 108' 41 59 715101 7 O'l'gE12 Mb500 59 L'leSpinell 14 Tr'm,bcl 1a T'xasT'b'ine 12 
Mar15 -601B.M 611 :13 It 48 113 B•J 910111s1j19 Sch'hFl2 M5ro:l SSTheWavel14Nigh lkenl13Web'sReg'r~12 
May 6 BM 3-8 fl :36½h May 2 BM 3-8 It :35½h April 26 BM 5-8 fl 1:03½b 
Royal Jane 115 Ch. I, 3, by Texas Sandman-Fighting Jane, by Sil,er Horde. 
Brttder, 0 . J. Todd. 1960 • M O O $125 
Owner, Mr. & Mrs . E. Ii . Sorrell . Trainer, J. Weatherington. 8~.ooo 1959 0 M O O 
May 4-6018.M 6 f 1:121,ll 40 113 4lj 521 55 SBJ Harm'zWI SOCO 70 Starl' lTow'rlOO Q'tWalcrs112 Wahalis 8 
/lpr26 -60 1B M 611 :11 1/, fl 91115 521 7ll 78! 711 Piercc03 Mdn 76 MissJoycellO Himalaya115 He ione 12 
MarJl -6058.M 6 I 1:12 It 173 113 1• 12 1h 43! PierceD2 4COO 79 Q"lWaters112 Facelieux113 BernO'Oine 12 
Mar23-601B.M 6 I 1:11~.rt 53 10'3 lO•J 871 811 e12 ShirolaM5 3500 72 HighDrag112 EdwardJ.114 RareToubo 12 
April 20 BM 5-8 fl 1:D1~l h Aprll 10 BM 3-8 It :36½h Marth 23 BM 1-2 fl :49h 
Bold Dust 115 B. f, 3, Bold Callanl-Garara, by Nirgal. 
Breeder, E. J , Harris. 1960 3 M O O --
Owner, E. & J. Harris. Trainer, F. Jolosky. trn,ooo 1959 2 M O O S40 
May 4-602B.M 6 f 1:12½ft251 114 Si 101•101 •101• HunlGI Mdn 66 Minnigerode118 11earYe118 Zipper-Bee 12 
Apr28-601B.M 6 f 1:14 sf 182 115 21! 4s 59 612 HuntGIO Mdn 61 Sals-R 'ge115 Sm'IT'wnGirlllS Kylew'd 12 
Apr14 -60 IB.M 6 f 1:11 1~1t 99 114 es1101010111019 HunlGT Mdn 65 GoHos!118 Principillo 118 FoxyRudy 11 
Sep23-595Pom a 6 f 1:14 ½ft 24 116 86! 89 79 616 Can l 'iJ• MSOOO 66 Dimity115 Mi ssGenelle116 SunC. 8 
Sep 3-591Dmr 6 f 1:1HW 88 116 101211f911IB11fB G'ithsR9 M750068 Gladio la116 Paul ineK.111 SocielyRose 12 
May 9 BM 3-8 fl :36½h April 4 BM 5-8 fl 1:05b 
Adagio 115 Ch. f, 3, by Esprit de France-Nautch Girl, &y Soodanl. "BS 
Breeder, Parkhill Larms Ltd. · 1960 11 M O 3 ..., 
Owner, Mr. & Mrs. N. C. Archer. Trainer, tt C. Archer. s;;,ooo 1959 7 M 1 1 $302 
~layl0 -60~8.M 6 f 1:12 It 32 115 87 BBJ ss 34i HunlG6 MSOOO 76 Facetieux110 Flower0ecklt5 Adagio 12 
Apr 2-60IB.M 6 f 1:10%11122 113 117i11Bl101•1Q15 GlennP9 4500 74 Slencil116 Armedf.l iss116 DarkSh'dows 11 
Mar17-60IB.M 1,', 1:451/ofl SO 113 e111011101•1021 Gl 'nnPIO M500051 Unreslr'ned113 K'rnPr'ss113 Brok'nL've 11 
Marl0-6018.M 6 f 1:12½ft 25 113 11 5j105i 510 671 GlennP• MSOOO 75 Pr'ssG'ki114 Chic'oMiss108 Unreslr'ned 12 
1,1.ar S-60IB.M 6 f 1:12 fl 27 107 8•! 51~ 613 69j GlennP5 3500 73 Re9'1Gl "a1G9 Capl'n8os'n113 Q'tWaters 9 
r,b22-603TuP SJ f 1.00 It Bl 115 52j 6• 52j S•j Ditlf'chH• Mdn 80Triba1Sec' l1 20 Fr' tyBomb115 Unwrilt'n 12 
Feb17-6GlTuP 6 f 1:12½11 Sl 113 55 55! 761 87 FreyPIO M3500 76 J akeH'grzss120 Ele'ILiz115 Time'sLasl 12 
J an20-60lTuP 6 f 1:13 ft 3! 110*11'3 811 35 23 Mu'yK12 M2500 77 PanchoDee120 Quico120 NowOn 12 
Jan17-601TuP SJ f 1:0!mgd 31 115 Pl 5• 41 4•1 Oiltf'chH3 Mdn 68 WingLo115 Transcribe115 BullCamp 10 
Jan 8-601 TuP 6! f 1:19',1,ft 25 110* 731 731 3! 3! MurrayK3 Mdn 76 Jean'sChes'l120 Directly120 Transcribe 10 
May 6 BM 5-8 It 1:D2½hg April 25 BM 3-4 ft 1:16½ h April 21 BM 3-8 fl :36½h 
Painted Pet 115 Ch. f, 3, by Mafosl.a-Gold Paint, by Cold Bridge. 
Breeder, F. R. Graham. 1~0 2 M O O --
Owner, Montrose Stable. Trainer, K. R. Darbyshire . SS,000 1959 8 M O 1 $130 
~\ay10-60•B.M 6 f 1:12 fl 71 115 21 32 4lj 610 Arl'rnJS MSOOO 73 Facetieux110 Flower0eck115 Adag io 12 
Apr21-60IB.M 6 f 1:ll¾fl 30 111 91610211029102• V'zkeM3 MSOOO 51 D'm 0 dMark118 Kilsimbanyi113 P'n'rJoe 12 
Dec14-593B.M 6 f 1:13-Y.fl 17 116 5• 7•1 95i 85! YakaR7 MSOOO 68 TurkishN ighl116 SunnyNote116 SunC. 12 
Dec10-59IB.M 6 f 1:1 3½1t 22 114 Bl! g• 11261127 YakaR II MSOOO 50 Slippery117 NoExi!114 Marl<etSpecia l 12 
Jun29-592L.P 4! f :53½1l 10 117 7 4• 32J 33 Rich'dson5 Mdn My BoyJ'n113 FoxeeLucee110 TigerTh'y 10 
Jun25-592L.P 4J f :54½1l 51 117 8 771 87J 77 Cop'nol1K2 Mdn BraveKni't113 FoxeeLucee110 Y'gRuf'n 10 
Jun15-591L.P 4! f :53½gd 51 118 6 4• 45 461 Cop'nolfK• Mdn Ur-Mia118 A.mcanCathyl11 Kydelle 9 
May 8-59lTan 5 f 1:011/slt 15 117 731 851 89l 791 V'zkeM9 M6000 78 BlueTish117 Nina deTejas117 Step gBy 11 
J,lay 4-593Tan Sf 1:00½fl 24 117 6•1 53! 43 7Bi Art'burnJ7 Mdn 82 Svalan117 Lady d'Arg'!112 N'a deTeja.s 7 
Apr20-593Tan Sf 1:01 fl Bl 115 1! 2h 43J 791 V'zkeM2 M8000 79 MissJ'hneieD.115 T'mO'Farrell118 Reins 11 
May 9 BM 3-8 ft :35½h May 5 BM 1-2 fl :48¥.,hg April 11 BM 5-8 ft 1:0Sbg 
Continuity 115 Ch. f, 3, by Bal.am<>-Sunny Pharlara, by Sun Briar. 
Breeder, 0 . R. Harrod. 1960 S M O 1 $375 
Owner, Mr. & Mrs. N. Jensen. Trainer, N. Jensr,n. •s.ooo 1959 3 ~1 O O $25 
J,lay10-6QIB.M 6 f 1:1H!;fl 28 115 7•1 56! 37 3•1 Art'rnJ6 MSOOO 80 Pilikia115 Ti11i es8aby l10 Continuity 12 
J,lay 4-60•B.M 111, 1:45¾ ft175 113 11 7Bl 717 816 Arl'burnJS Mdn60 Peno118 Princ lpill o118 EdenBelle 8 
Apr28-601B.M 6 f 1:14 sf 18 115 96i 7Bl 611 512 Ar'burnJII Mdn 61 Sals-R'ge115 Sm'IT'wnGir1115 Kylew'd 12 
Apr21 -601B.M 6 f 1:131/sfl 52 113 551 54i 46! 481 Arl'rnJ 7 MSCXXJ 67 D'm'dMark118 Kilsimbanyi113 P'n'rJoe 12 
Mar29-60• B.M 6 f 1:12 fl 110 113 8SJ 76J 79} 711 Arl'burnJB Mdn 72 KerryP ipcr118 Graphitel18 Nightken 12 
Sep 3-59l lga SJ f 1:08~"gd 59 115 10Bl11}6j11}6J 55J FreyP• M500070 Warbr'k118 Mirac'l 'm118 Dar'glnlrigue 12 
Aug26-591Lga 5! f 1:05V,ft 41 115 7•f 7•f 9111116 Sim'isG12 Mdn 75 JelTiger118 Maleficenl118 SealairQu'n 12 
May25-59lE.P a 3J f :421/ssy 3 •115 8 891 881 MarshW7 Mdn 79 GwenethGl 'nl 11 TigerTh'ryl 18 B'byJoe 8 
April 27 BM 3.8 sy :J7h March 23 BM 3-8 ft :36½h March 19 BM 3-4 ft 1:15½hg 
Tillies Baby 110 Br. f1 J, by Star Tmeler-Till Lykke, by Boxth, m. 
. Brtt<>er, A. L. Holme,. 19SO I M I O $'125 
Owner, A. L. Holmes. Trainer, A. Peters. ets,ooo 1959 1 M O O --
l!ay10-601B.M 611 :11¥.ft 91110° 11 1• 1• 2"k F'zierBl M500085Pi likia115 Till ics8aby110 Continuity12 
Jly ~597Pln 5 f :S!W>fl 12 118 1• 12 93• 935 M'yh'nB5 AlwM 57 knatz118 Kenly'sLover115 FrenchFilly 9 
May 5 BM 3-4 ft 1:15W! April 29 BM 5-8 ft 1:0Hi h April 18 BM 3-8 ft :36hg 
Past Performances-First Race at Bay Meadows 




3 WEIGHT TO BE CARRIED THIS RACE 
24 1968; PERCENTAGE OF RACES IN WHICH HORSE FINISHED FIRST,SECONO,OR . THIR 
55 ~EIGHT HORSE CARRIED IN HIS LAST RACE 
58 SPEED RATING CORRECTED BY TRACK VARIANT FOR . HORSE'S LAST RACE 
83 IS THE JOCKEY ONE OF THE LEADING JOCKEYS IN THIS RACE? 
RAC .[ 
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~EIGHT TO Al CARRIED THIS RACE 
1965: PERCENTAGE OF RACES IN WHICH HORSE FINISHED FIRST,SECONO,OR THIRD 
~EIGHT HORSE CARRIED IN HIS LAST RACE 
SPEED RATING CORRECTED BY TRACK VARIANT FOR HORSE'S LAST RACE 
IS THE JOCKEY ONE OF THE LEADING JOCKEYS IN THIS RACE? 
1968: NUM8ER OF STARTS 
~U~8ER OF DAYS SINCE HORSE'S LAST RACE 
N U ; 1 cl E R OF L E i~ G T H S H O R S E F I N I S HE D 8 E H I N D L E A D E R I N L A S T R A C E 
SPEE~ RATING OF HORSE CORRECTED GY TRACK VARIANT IN NEXT-TO-LAST RACE 
SPEED RATING OF HORSE CORRECTED BY TRACK VARIANT ON SECOND-TO-LAST RACE 
CL4IMING PRICE THIS RACE 
HIGHEST CLASS AT AQUEDUCT THIS SEASO N 
1967: PERCENTAGE OF RACES IN WHICH HORSE FINISHED FlRST,SECOND,OR THIRD 
R A !'! K I I\: P A C E R A T I N G C O R R , F O R W T , : B E S T R A C E T H I S Y R , A T " A II A T 6 F O N F A S T T R A C K CLASS OF HORSE I S L.AST RACE . . . . ·-.. .. . . 
Fit·dSHING POSITION OF HORSE IN LAST RACE ..... , ... 0 ••• ~ ,, ••• •••••• ---···· · ·"'"'··--'· ••• ,., •••• , 
NUMBE R OF DAYS SINCE NEXT-TO-LAST RACE 
CLASS OF HORSE I N NEX T-TO-LAST RACE 
NUM5 ER OF DAYS SINCE SECOND-TO-LAST RACE 
WA S HORSE 1 S LAST RACE RUN AT AQUEDUCT? 
AGE 
S[X 
HIGHEST CLASS ON HORSE'S PAST PERFORMANCE CHART 
HIEST CLASS AT ''A'' THIS YR AT 6F W/ FlNlSH .1,2,3.,4 OR W/!N 1/4 .L.E.NGTH O.F LEADER 
1968: NUMBER OF WINS 
1966; TOTAL MONEY WON 
1967; NUMBER OF STARTS 
1967; NUMBER OF WI NS 
1967: TOTAL MONEY WON 
NU~SER OF RACES IN LAST 21 DAYS 
D I S T A N C E A T I-! H I C H H O R S E H A S R A C E D M O S T OF T E: N 
FASTEST SPEED RATING ON PAST PERFORMANCE CHART FOR RACES OF 6F 
OISTA~Cl OF HORSE'S LAST RACE 
NU~BER OF LE NGTHS GAINED OR LOST IN THE STRETCH IN ~AST RACE 
• In HORSE FAIL TO GAI N ON THE LEADER AT ANY CALL IN THE ·LAST RACE? 
DISTANCE OF NEXT-TO-LAST RACE 
DISTANCE OF LAST WORKOUT 
TI ~E OF LAST WORKOUT 
NUMBER OF DAYS SI NCE LAST 
rs THE TRAINER ONE OF TH~ . 
1,JORKOUT 










Test-Retes t Cons istency at Low (5 Predictors) and High (40 Predictors) 





Index of Reliability Predictors Predictors 
Changes in first- 9/40 14/40 
place selections 22 % 39 % 
Changes in any 91/200 121/200 
of five ranks 45.5% 60.5% 
Differences 153 220 
in ranks:-'~ 
Sum of differences is less for 5 than for 40 predictors in 
30/37 races (3 ties) 
Conclusion: Expert handicappers are much less consistent 
with 40 predictor items than with 5 predictor i terns. 
Example: Race N: 5 predictors 
First ranking of Race N: 8 










The first-place horse changed; the horses changed at four 
out of five ranks; sum of differences= 3+0+2+1+2=8. 





















s lO 40 
IT<=MS OF I NFoP.MA TION 
Figure 4. Mean changes in confidence and accuracy with increas ing 





























The \ens mode. I 
SUBJECT 
RESPONSE= Y s 
PREDICTED 
SUBJECT 
" RESPONSE =Y5 
























method of a~alysis: tbe '' lens model" (see Figure 5) 
l. r = ry y acbievement a 
e s 
2. G = ry y policy validity (appropriateness of 
e s judge's weights and function forms) 
3. R = ry y policy consistency (random error)--s index of control s s 
4. R = ry y environmental consistency e 
e e 
5. r = GR R the lens model equation a s e 
results 
1. subjects gain knowledge of nonlinear policies but predict 
poorly (low r) due to high degree of inconsistency (low 
R - lack of ~ontrol) in executing the policy. 
s 
LINEAR TASK 
1·--•- -·--·--·--·--•--·- -· 
I •-•-........ ✓•-•-......... ✓•-• I •/' • • 
-~ /"'·---·-·-·, .,,,,.. / . 
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• --• Rt 
•---• G 
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2 3 4 5 6 7 e g m 
BLOCK 
Fie. I.. Indexes of achievement (r .), knowledge (G), and control (R,) in two mult iple-cue 
probability learning tasks. (In each task cond itiou, u = 20.) 
From Hammond & Summers (1972) 
B 
2. Outcome feedback impedes control over the execution of one's 
knowledge in the nonlinear tas k. (Hammond, Summers, & Deane, 1973) 
.0 





I \ ,l \ 
I \ ,..• ' I \ ,-_., \ _.,.. 
123 • 567890 
BLOCKS 
KhOWLEOGE ( G) 
1.0 
.Ir>- . 
I I ~ 
h·~•=· ... ·r"""':::.7 
I\ f\ 
-~ I I I \ 
G • l \ • ,' ' 
: \ ,'\ : \ , 
: ~ / \ I \/ 
! ~ ,' \/ • 
I ..._ I • 
,· .... 
• / •-- - • OUTCOMES 
•
1 
•-• OUT COt.l ES • TASK INFORM.. 
•=• lAS t< INFORM , 
123 • 5678910 
BLOCKS 
CONTROL (R1 ) 
o--------
I 2 3 • 5 G 7 8 9 10 
BLOCKS 
Frn. 7. Menu nchi cvement (r,), knowledge (G) and control (R,) iudi ccs plotted 
o\'cr bl or·ks of '.LO lri nls ncco rdi ng to expcrimcntnl co ndition . 
I if r . 0 r-,\y 
,. · '- C)u..i-~o!'f'e. \Y'\~o • 
9 
3. Brehmer ( 19 71) finds that , even when you tell Ss what weigh ts and 
functional relationships to employ, they have difficulties being 
consistent. 
C. Systematic biases 
1. general hypothesis 
Man's limited memory, attention, and reasoning capabilities lead him 
to apply simple strain-reducing strategies when processing information. 
While these strategies may be efficient in some situations, in others 
they induce systematic biases that make the decision maker's actions 
inconsistent with his "true 11 preferences or beliefs. 
2. Examples a, b, & c. Influence of response mode upon risk-taking 
decisions 
. 
a. When subjects rate the attractiveness of playing a gamble, 
probability of winning is the most important determiner of their 
responses ; when they estimate the monetary worth of a gamble, 





Percentage of ~s for Whom a Given · 
Risk Di mens Ion \·las Most Important 
Risk Dimension 
PW Sw PL SL 
Computed \'/eights 
Rating Group (N=BB) 50 09 15 26 
-
Bldd i ng Group CM = 125) 18 19 10 53 
, 
Subjective \·/eights 
Rating Group (N=43l 45 13 26 16 
Bidding Group CN=50l 40 18 24 16 
b. Given pairs of bets such as those below, subjects in Las Vegas 
often chose to play Bet A rather than Bet B, but they attached a 
higher monetary worth to Bet B. Such inconsistencies reflect 
systematic bias intervening between 11 true values 11 and observed 
preferences. They result from subjects using different 
information-process ing strategies when choosing and setting 
prices. 
Bet A 
11/12 chance to win 12 chips 
1/12 chance to lose 24 chips 
where each chip is worth 25¢ . 
Bet B 
2/12 chance to win 79 chips 
10/12 chance to lose 5 chips 
c. Individuals' preferences for long-shot bets were assessed by 
two methods: choices and selling prices --some persons gave 
selling prices consistent with their choices; others did not 






























• ID •z.o +30 
MEAN PREHRENCE FOR HIE 
$ err-- CHOICE INDEX 
FJG. 8', Rela tionship between choice and selling-
price indrxes ncross the total sample of subjrcts 
(1'=.46). 
10 
3. Sl®c & MacPhi llamy found t hat dimensions common to each alternative 
in a choice had greater influence upon decisions than dimensions that 
were unique to a particular alternative, even though the judges did 







Examples of Stimulus Pairs in the 





Student -+ A B Student-+ A 
NAch 67 59 NAch 618 
Eng 86 Eng 
Quant 452 Quant 382 
A B A 
NAch 33 NAch 
Eng 119 90 Eng 1157 
Quant 4111 Quant 348 
A B A 
NAch 27 NAch 
Eng 74 Eng 469 












4. The experiments described above suggest that the compatibility or 
comrnensurability between a cue dimension and the required decision 
affects the importance of that cue in determining the decision. 
5. biased perceptions of probabilistic events--"the law of small numbers" 
Tversky G Kahneman (1971) observed that people have strong intuitions 
about random sampling; these intuitions are shared by naive persons 
and sophisticated scientists, and they are wrong in fundamental ways 
with resulting unfortunate consequences in the course of scientific 
inquiry. They concluded that the typical scientist: 
a. has undue confidence in early trends from the first few data 
points and in the stability of observed patterns; 
b. rarely attributes a deviation of results from expectations to 
sampling variability because he finds a causal explanation for 
any discrepancy. 
These results suggest that investors may be too quick to infer 
that their policies are not working and too quick to change 
policies to remedy this apparent (but often illusory) failure . 
D. Insight into one ' s own policy 
Judges' insight into their own weighting policies is poor. They typically 
overestimate their weightings of minor cues and fail to recognize the 
extent to which their judgments can be predicted by only a few cues. 
Greater experience in the task may lead to poorer self-insight (see 







Profit Margin Trend 
DOWII 




Near Term Prospects 
POOR 
Pl: Ratio Comoarison 
GOOD 





3 4 s 
No 
Chan;ie 
6 7 9 
Subs t anti.,l 
Increase 
FIG.CJ .- Exnmplc of a sli111ul11~ company. The respon se scnle is at the 
/), 
Table 4 
Comparison between In1port nncc of EfTect and 
Subjective Weights across Thirteen Brokers and Five Students 
Broker No. Student No. 
Menn for Mean for 
Factor 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 flrokcr~ 2 3 4 5 Students 
Importance of clicct: 
IND .... ... ....... .. 02 OJ 09 09 07 03 10 04 04 13 10 14 03 07 03 IO 14 04 12 09 
RES ..... ... ... ..... 12 18 OG 01 15 01 09 13 14 OG 13 01 03 09 01 11 01 08 05 05 
SUPP ..... ... ....... 20 28 06 05 07 11 06 15 07 10 21 02 OG 11 03 04 OG 05 01 04 
VOL . ' ..... . ... . ... . 16 07 08 13 08 14 06 18 13 17 07 02 04 10 14 07 04 02 00 05 
NTP .. ... ....... .. .. 16 07 27 34 13 14 25 16 22 25 09 11 15 18 13 07 15 14 00 IO 
PMT ................ 09 05 05 02 11 20 14 09 10 09 11 24 22 12 13 18 JO 17 JO 14 
PER . ' . . ... ......... 13 02 24 14 03 07 09 12 02 09 14 15 23 11 04 12 16 22 33 17 
EYT . ' ... ' .......... 12 32 14 22 36 31 21 13 28 09 14 32 24 22 48 29 34 29 39 36 
Subjective weight: 
IND ......... .. .... . 15 25 10 15 10 20 15 15 13 15 10 10 15 14 10 03 20 09 18 12 
RES .... .. .......... 08 06 05 00 05 10 10 15 08 05 20 20 05 09 00 01 05 07 03 03 
SUPP ... ...... .. .... 08 06 06 00 05 10 10 15 08 05 20 20 10 09 00 01 05 07 03 03 
VOL ... ' ............ 12 20 09 20 JO 15 15 05 15 15 20 15 10 14 20 05 15 10 03 11 
NTP .. ..... ...... ... 12 04 30 20 10 10 20 10 20 15 05 05 20 14 13 10 05 12 15 1J 
PMT .. . . .... ..... .. . 10 04 05 05 10 15 07 15 05 10 05 10 10 08 08 25 10 12 15 14 
PER . . .... .. . ... .. .. 20 10 15 20 10 05 15 15 11 20 10 05 15 13 09 20 20 20 22 18 
EYT ................ 15 25 20 20 40 15 08 10 20 15 10 15 15 18 40 35 20 24 20 28 
NoTE.-The hi ghest entry In cnch column Is ln boldface type, 
IV. Facilitating Adherence to Policy 
A. If a decision maker is to approach subjective optimality (a condition 
wherein his actions are consistent with his underlying values and beliefs) , 
B. 
random errors and systematic biases must be minimized. 
Eliminating random error by 11boots trapping 11 
The judge's policy equation may do a better job of predicting some out-
come 01~ implementing the judge's personal values than the judge himself 
could do. 
" ... humans tend to generate 'correct' strategies but then, in turn, 
fail to use their own strategy with any great consistency. One 
is left with the conclusion that humans may be used to generate infer-
ence strategies but that once the strategy is obtained the human should 
be removed from the system and replaced by his own strategy [Dudycha & 
Naylor, 1966 J. 11 
C. Analytic thinking--the decomposition principle 
"The spirit of decision analysis is divide and conquer: Decompose a 
complex problem into simpler problems, get your thinking stra{ght in these 
simpler problems, paste these analyses together with a logical glue, and 
come out with a program for action for the complex problem. Experts are 
not asked complicat ed, fuzzy questions, but crystal clear, unambiguous , 
elemental, hypothetical questions [Raiffa, 196 8]. 11 
D. Cognitive feedback 
Hammond (1971) demonstrates th at computerized feedback, showing the judge 
how his judgment policy compares to the desired policy, leads to dramatic 
increases in ability to execute a policy with consistency and precision . 
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Figure 10. Cognitive feedback displays for 
a multiple-cue learning t ask. 
Test blocks 
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Computer graphics group 
Outcome + tasl< information 
Outcome only 
21-40 41 -60 61- BO 160-200 
Asymptote Trial blocks 
Figure 11. Learning curve for computer graphics group cornpared 
































•l ,0'--''--'---__._ ___ .__ __ ....._ _ __. 
2 3 
BLOCK 
FIG. l.:l.• Indexes of achievement (r.), knowledge 
(G), and control (R,) in a nonlinear inference task 
when cognitive fcec.lback is presented in the form of 
graphic displays. (Block = 10 trials.) 
14 
A. A general introduction to this type of research is provided in the article: 
Slovic, P. Psychological study of human judgment: Implications for 
investment decision making. The Journal of Finance, 1972, 23, 779-799. 
B. I will be happy to supply additional references for the work described 
in this talk. 
